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Abstract. In this article, the author provides a cursory introduction of the idea to base the interpretation of the functional me-
chanisms of territorial communities on Kuhn’s treatment of the paradigms of scientific communities. According to the author’s 
interpretation and treatment, territorial communities are human associations that are related to self-organizing territories, the 
sequence of timely states, which are being called a process. From this, it ensues that a territorial community is a process. Based 
on the author’s position and the context of territorial communities, paradigms can be explained as follows: the paradigms of 
territorial communities determine the important objects with which the community deals and the related problems and/or 
questions that are established and the methods whereby theses problems and/or questions are resolved.
Keywords: territorial community, paradigm, anomaly, crisis, revolutions, developmental states (preliminary, ordinary and 
subsequent states).
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Santrauka. Šiame straipsnyje autorius pateikia samprotavimus siekdamas pagrįsti teritorinių bendruomenių funkcijas pagal 
Kuhno socialinės bendruomenės paradigmos suvokimą. Anot autoriaus, teritorinės bendruomenės yra žmonių asociacijos, 
kurios susietos savivaldos teritorijomis, būsenų laike seka, kuri vadinama procesu. Dėl to galima teigti, kad teritorinė bendruo-
menė nuolat vystosi. Remiantis autoriaus pozicija ir teritorinės bendruomenės kontekstu, paradigmos gali būti aiškinamos taip: 
teritorinės bendruomenės paradigmos nustato svarbius jai objektus ir su jais susijusias problemas bei metodus, kurie leidžia 
išspręsti bendruomenės problemas.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: teritorinė bendruomenė, paradigma, anomalija, krizė, revoliucijos, raidos būsenos (preliminari, įprasta 
ir vėlesnė).
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1. Introduction
According to the author’s interpretation, a territorial com-
munity is a constant and developing process, which has 
no objective outside itself. A territorial community can be 
compared to a religious community, for instance, or with 
S. Kuhn’s scientific community.
In his famous essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Kuhn has called the structures of scientific inquiry paradi-
gms. By this he means generally recognized scientific achie-
vements that provide examples for communities of experts 
in identifying and resolving problems (Kuhn 2003).
The object and purpose of this article, as established 
by the author, is to search for support in Kuhn’s paradigms 
for the philosophical interpretation and epistemological 
description of the functional mechanisms of territori-
al communities, and to see whether Kuhn’s treatment of 
paradigms can, in principle, be expanded to include ter-
ritorial communities; all the more because Kuhn himself 
draws parallels between changes in political and scientific 
paradigms (Kuhn 2003). The author poses the exploratory 
question of whether territorial communities can be treated 
as paradigms and whether the author’s interpretation that 
territorial communities are directed by paradigms is jus-
tified. The answer to the former question is negative, and 
affirmative for the latter.
The method that was used is theory and the compara-
tive analysis of the author’s positions, as well as modeling. 
The primary reference work is the aforementioned essay 
by Kuhn.
The author has also followed the criticisms of Kuhn’s 
approach that have been penned by British philosopher 
K. R. Popper (1999) and philosophy professor J. Watkins 
(1999) the student and colleague of the former from the 
London School of Economics.
As a result of the theoretical interpretation in this article, 
the author has compiled a model of the developmental sta-
ges affected by the paradigms of territorial communities as 
processes, i.e. a general picture of how the author has dealt 
with territorial communities as processes and the paradi-
gms that are their influencers. Further elaboration of the 
issues dealt with in this article can be found in the author’s 
corresponding research paper.
2. Territorial community – process or paradigm?
Since 1974 many studies have been conducted on different 
types of communities (territorial, work and school com-
munities, interest and values communities, etc.) and many 
questionnaires have been developed to measure sense of 
community (Prezza et al. 2009).
McMillan (1986) defined sense of community as “a fee-
ling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members 
matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith 
that members’ needs will be met through their commitment 
to be together.” McMillan and Chavis (1986) identified four 
dimensions that constitute sense of community (members-
hip, influence, shared emotional connection, and needs 
fulfillment) and that interact dynamically to create and 
maintain it.
There are several instruments available to measure sense 
of community. Just to mention two of them: the Sense of 
Community Index-short form (SCI) (Perkins et al. 1990), 
and the Perceived Sense of Community Scale (PSCS) 
(Bishop, Chertok and Jason 1997). A recent study was desi-
gned to validate a new Multidimensional Territorial Sense 
of Community Scale (MTSOCS) based on McMillan and 
Chavis’s theory (Prezza et al. 2009).
According to the author’s interpretation and treatment, 
territorial communities (villages, rural municipalities, 
towns, and the historical settlement of cities) are processes. 
A cursory explanation of the author’s approach follows.
Territorial communities are in a constant state of deve-
lopment, or process, without having any objectives outside 
themselves. Here the author refers to the Lithuanian phi-
losopher A. Maceina, according to whom territorial com-
munities lack objectives outside themselves – communities 
just have an idea, which they realize with their own exis-
tence (Maceina 1990). The internal objectives are related 
to satisfying the needs of their members. The development 
of territorial communities in Estonia confirms that despi-
te various foreign occupations that destroyed the country, 
as well as devastating epidemics and wars that destroyed 
entire villages, the drive for social cohabitation, or the habit 
of living together communally, has survived from ancient 
times to the present day.
Today a question may arise of whether territorial com-
munities are even viable. The results of R. S. Oropesa’s study 
support the view of the local community as a viable, specia-
lized entity in modern society. Communities remain viable 
because they are organized to serve the instrumental needs 
of specific segments of the population. As predicted by the 
community of limited liability model, participation in local 
associations is structured around the life cycle and other 
investment characteristics of residents (Oropesa 1987). The 
fact that territorial communities could be treated as proces-
ses is also recognized by G. Morgan, when he writes that by 
treating an organization’s activities as a rational and technical 
process,1 the mechanical figurative system tends to diminish 
the human aspects of organizations and to ignore the fact 
that assignments facing organizations are often much more 
complicated, vaguer and more difficult than the majority of 
operations executed by machines (Morgan 1997).
1 That is, organizations, which include territorial corporate bodies, 
can be considered processes but not only technical processes.
Having received confirmation from the aforementioned, 
the author has taken the position that a territorial commu-
nity is a self-regulating human association connected to a 
territory and its sequence of time-related states is called 
a process. It follows that a territorial community is a pro-
cess – whether it can be managed or not and by whom or 
what it can be managed is a separate issue.
As the figure below shows, this process has a beginning, 
evolution, and termination or end point (see the dashed 
arrow). This applies if adaption to new “revolutionary” 
changes in the paradigm is not achieved or for other reasons 
(such as the dying out/destruction of all the members of the 
community). Otherwise (the dashed arrow in the figure), 
the process evolves and questions recede into the changes 
in the paradigm.
Kuhn does not equate the scientific community with 
scientific paradigm. The author also does not plan to equate 
territorial communities or their paradigms. A paradigm is a 
“certain way of seeing the world”, which once accepted by a 
number of scientists creates a community from these scien-
tists; or a religious community from believers; or a territorial 
community from the people living on a certain territory.
Instead of paradigms, the scientific philosopher 
Feyerabend speaks about ideologies, which should be tre-
ated as substantively similar to paradigms. Feyerabend con-
siders science to be an ideology alongside many others and 
also differentiates various ideologies within science.
The aforementioned has also answered the question of 
whether a territorial community is a paradigm – the answer 
is negative.
3. Could a (territorial) community be managed  
by a paradigm?
The Greek word παράδειγμα (paradigm) means example. 
The original definition of paradigm was an example that 
served as a model, a standard, epitome or prototype. Today, 
this word is used as a term in several fields of activity. In 
rhetoric, a paradigm or example is understood to mean an 
instructive story told in the course of argumentation. In the 
history of science, a paradigm is defined as a constant and 
generally recognized system of concepts, laws and methods, 
on which the practice of scientific examination and tea-
ching of science is based. In his concept of the philosophy 
of science, Kuhn started to define a paradigm as a method of 
conducting science that is acquired by example. In popular 
language, the word has started to denote a framework of 
thought or way of doing things in some field of activity.
Kuhn came to understand that traditional scientific 
interpretations, which are related to inductive concepts or 
falsification, do not correspond to reality. Thus, Kuhn tried 
to create his own scientific theory to be in greater conformi-
ty with scientific development as he saw it.  Kuhn’s theory 
is characterized by a special emphasis on the revolutionary 
character of scientific progress; in this context, revolution 
means the abandonment of an established theoretical struc-
ture and its replacement with a new one that is not related to 
the former (Chalmers 1998). A second important feature is 
the significant role played by the sociological characteristics 
of the scientific circles.
Based on Kuhn’s definition, the paradigms of a scienti-
fic community should be interpreted as general theoretical 
assumptions and laws, as well as their means of implemen-
tation, which are used by the members of the corresponding 
scientific community that shapes and develops the paradi-
gm with its activities. Kuhn calls activities of the people that 
work within the framework of the paradigm normal science 
(Chalmers 1998).
Based on the author’s interpretation, every community 
has its own paradigms, the ingredients of which are its set 
system and customs, as well as recorded standards, convicti-
ons, dogmas, historical experience, but also its actual states 
and common goals. Paraphrasing what Kuhn has written 
about the scientific community, by examining and prac-
ticing these customs, experiences and other aforementio-
ned factors, the members of the corresponding community 
learn their roles, which are passed down from generation to 
generation or from older members to younger ones. These 
are the common bases in the corresponding community. 
The members of the community base their actions on the 
examples of others, which they have acquired from the expe-
riences transferred to them as well as from written sour-
ces (and from here Kuhn continues with the words) often 
without knowing or needing to know what characteristics 
have been bestowed on these examples by the status of the 
paradigms adopted by the community. This learning and 
teaching process evolves throughout the life of the commu-
nity members. Paradigms can occur earlier, and be more 
binding and complete than any other sets of rules2 (the 
author’s emphasis), that might be unambiguously derived 
from them (Kuhn 2003).
Based on the idea of the definition borrowed from Kuhn 
by the author, a paradigm of a territorial community should 
be interpreted as general theoretical assumptions and laws 
(including practices) and their means of implementation 
that are used by the members of the corresponding territo-
rial community that shape and develop the paradigm with 
its activities.
M. Polanyi has also written about the teaching of scienti-
fic philosophy based on traditions and example in his book 
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(Polanyi 1974 and 2004). A simplified explanation is that 
Polanyi’s idea was to transfer the concepts of master and 
2 “Research regulations” in Kuhn’s text.
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apprentice from handicraft and art to science. Polanyi 
acknowledged the role of inherited practices (traditions). 
The following idea originated with Polanyi: “The fact that 
we know more than we are able to express, leads to the con-
clusion that a great deal of knowledge is transferred to the 
“apprentice” implicitly, as the latter observes the activities 
of the master and practices under his direction.”
Based on a private philosophy-related conversation with 
Eintalu3, paradigms in the context of territorial communi-
ties could summarily be explained as follows: the paradi-
gms of a territorial community determine the important 
objects that the community deals with, along with the 
related problems and/or questions and the resolutions 
provided for these problems and/or questions.
A territorial community as process cannot be managed 
by the managers chosen to do so. Actually, the members 
of a territorial community do not choose managers, but 
representative(s) – the latter in turn hire servants/employees 
and organizers for the community, not managers. Based 
on the author’s interpretation, a territorial community is 
managed (influenced) by paradigms, by direct example 
or separate rules, thereby generating changes in the com-
munity.
Based on the aforementioned, the author takes the 
position that the influencers of territorial communities are 
paradigms, which, paraphrasing Kuhn, includes the general 
achievements of communal development that provide the 
members of the community with an example for deter-
mining and resolving problems for a certain period of 
time.
Here it is appropriate to introduce parallels with religious 
communities or political parties, where the community is 
also managed (influenced) by paradigms, not by bishops or 
party secretaries – without disparaging the role of the latter. 
P. Feyerabend also compares religious and scientific ideolo-
gies in his book Science in an Free Society (Feyerabend 1978). 
According to Feyerabend, the difference between science and 
voodoo or religions is not in methods but in objectives.
The contemporary sociology of religion observes a 
change in the paradigm of religion and the treatment of 
religion, asserting among other things that the master nar-
rative in the old paradigm of sociology of religion is “linear 
secularization” while in the new paradigm it is “revival and 
routinization”. S. W. Goldstein (2009) presents the corres-
ponding treatment.
We should also mention that the trends and events of 
global change, and increasingly available information, have 
resulted in a new understanding of world affairs that also 
impacts the community paradigm. According to J. Pugh, 
in the last few decades there has been a spatial turn in thin-
3 EBS Lecturer of Philosophy Jüri Eintalu, PhD.
king in the social sciences and humanities. The spatial turn 
is a paradigm shift in outlook and perspective, extending 
far beyond the academic discipline of ‘geography’. These 
include climate change, the worldwide disaggregation of 
international production processes, global human rights, 
liberal democracy promotion, fair trade, imperialism, post-
colonialism, genetically modified (GM) foods, Iraq, indi-
genous peoples, Afghanistan, the cyclone that devastated 
Burma, and the earthquake that hit China in 2008. In all 
cases, the spatial is increasingly seen as a something that 
is more than a predefined territorial container of political 
life (Pugh 2009).
The success of the community depends on people 
and social capital, among other things. According to E. 
Humphreys, the most enthusiastic proponents of social capi-
tal identify it as the key explanatory factor in economically 
prosperous and well-governed territorial communities. The 
tendency is to reduce the concept to the ‘sense of communi-
ty’ and voluntary association (Humphreys 2007).
One must not forget the macroeconomic processes that 
are influenced by the government and competition as factors 
impacting paradigms. V. Navickas and A. Malakauskaite 
directed our attention to the fact that the impact of govern-
ment on macroeconomic processes is quite relevant. It 
manifests itself through various functions of governance 
and administration. The main mission of governing bodies 
is to assure economic and political stability. Modern eco-
nomic policy is based on the concept of clusters (Navickas 
and Malakauskaite 2008). R. Ginevičius and V. Podvezko 
argue that when a country’s economy is being restructured, 
the differences in the economic and social development of 
various regions become more prominent. To smooth these 
differences, a number of scientific and practical problems 
associated with the concepts of regions, regional policies 
and their aims, the determination of a region’s boundaries, 
and evaluation of its development, etc., should be tho-
roughly investigated. To solve such complicated problems, 
evaluation methods based on multiple criteria have to be 
used, which also take into consideration the major aspects 
of the economic and social development in the regions 
(Ginevičius and Podvezko 2009). A. V. Rutkauskas has ana-
lyzed the methodical and practical aspects of a country’s 
(region’s) competiveness, sustainable development strategy 
and means of implementation and found that success in risk 
management should be a factor of the highest importance 
for tackling the issue of the sustainability of the country’s 
(i.e. territorial communities – author’s remark) competiti-
veness development (Rutkauskas 2008).
If we were to ask how, for instance, territorial, scienti-
fic, or religious communities differ, then without descen-
ding into an in-depth analysis, the author can state that 
the main difference is in the paradigms and direction of 
its objectives (inwards or outwards) – territorial commu-
nities are also differentiated by territorial principles and 
circumstances (a proposition that the author arrived at in 
the course of his research) and that territorial communities 
are not organizations (in the case of scientific communities, 
it is also not always, if at all, possible to speak of a uniform 
organization). The differences in departing from various 
communities should also be pointed out: if a member of 
the community leaves a territorial community (for instance 
moves elsewhere), he or she is no longer a member of that 
community; if a scientist leaves a scientific community or 
a believer a religious community, they must abandon the 
corresponding paradigms. Scientific, political and religious 
communities differ, but are significantly closer to each other 
than territorial communities are to either of them. Ad hoc 
conclusion – various types of communities are substan-
tively different.
If we were to ask how the paradigms of territorial, 
scientific or religious communities differ, then without 
descending into an in-depth analysis, the author concludes 
that paradigms as the way of doing something, which are 
acquired based on example in any field of activity or as a 
framework of thought or as general theoretical assumptions 
and laws (including practices), are formally characteristic 
of every community. The substantive differences between 
paradigms result from differences between the communi-
ties. Ad hoc conclusion – the paradigms of various types 
of communities are substantively similar.
Answering the question of whether and by who or what 
a territorial community can be managed, the author takes 
the position that territorial communities are processes 
that cannot be managed by elected or hired leaders, but 
which are managed (influenced) by the community’s 
paradigms, which are in turn constantly changing.
4. Changes in paradigms
Of course, all the members of a community do not always 
agree about everything. This would be unreasonable. Even 
more, one must take the position that a community has 
various paradigms; whereas smaller “partial paradigms” 
may exist inside the paradigms (compare this to the above 
interpretation by Feyerabend related to the internal ideo-
logies of ideology). What Kuhn writes about the scientific 
community may leave the impression that a community4 
is a single monolithic and unified undertaking that must 
survive or collapse along with any of its paradigms, or with 
all of them together. But a community5 is probably seldom 
or never like this (Kuhn 2003).
The existing situation is usually tolerated while the para-
digms or examples seem firm. Based on Kuhn’s treatment of 
4 Here, Kuhn means the scientific community and uses the defi-
nition “normal science”.
5 “Science” in Kuhn’s text.
paradigms in the scientific community, they may agree on 
the identification of the paradigm, without agreeing with its 
total interpretation or rational formulation [rationalization] 
or even attempting to do so. The lack of a standard interpre-
tation, or differences related to the issue of the withdrawal of 
rules, does not prevent the paradigms from managing (Kuhn 
2003) the development of the community. Until paradigms 
are securely in place, they may also function without una-
nimity related to their rational formulations or without any 
attempt to rationally formulate them (Kuhn 2003).
But how do changes in paradigms occur? Paraphrasing 
Kuhn, the changes are not independent events, but long 
episodes with regular repetitive structures. Discovery starts 
with the recognition of an anomaly, continues with the 
investigation of the anomaly’s domain and does not end 
until new knowledge corresponding to the paradigm6 is 
adapted, so that the anomalous phenomenon becomes the 
expected norm.
As the author has recognized in the course of his rese-
arch, we can never know precisely when territorial com-
munity began and we assume that its demise will never 
arrive. We live from moment to moment thinking that we 
can influence the change of the system’s current state (for 
instance, by managing processes) into a desired state. Such 
a change is possible through changes in paradigms, the 
beginnings of which cannot be predetermined. The author 
gets encouragement for this treatment and interpretation 
from Kuhn’s interpretation, when he writes that any attempt 
to determine the date of a discovery within these or similar 
limits must inevitably be arbitrary, because the discovery 
of a new type of phenomenon is definitely a complex event 
that comprises the recognition that something exists, as well 
as what it is (Kuhn 2003). Based on the author’s interpre-
tation, Kuhn’s statement is also applied to the “date” of a 
community’s origin.
Failures may also be starting points for anomalies that 
in turn create backgrounds for the discovery of something 
new. It is impossible to say precisely when the discovery that 
discovers a new phenomenon occurs. Kuhn provides the 
following characteristics: prior awareness of the anomaly, the 
step-by-step and simultaneous emergence of this recognition, 
and the subsequent changes in the paradigm categories and 
procedures often encounter resistance (Kuhn 2003), i.e. in 
the case of the latter, the community’s ability to adapt is 
important.
Here, we might ask, which states of consciousness are 
the given discoveries based on? Osho7 (2009) has divided 
6 “Theory” in Kuhn’s text.
7 Born Chandra Mohan Jain (11 December 1931 – 19 January 
1990). Since the 1960s, also known as Acharya Rajneesh. In 
the 1970s and 80s, he called himself Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. 
In 1989, he took the name of Osho. Was an Indian mystic and 
spiritual teacher, as well as a philosophy professor.
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the stages of consciousness in three: the lowest stage is ins-
tinct, the middle stage is intellect and the highest stage is 
intuition. Do the changes in communal paradigms result 
from instinct, intellect or intuition, or from consciousness 
as a whole?  Can we, and if so, at what stage, can we talk 
about the collective consciousness or collective instinct, 
collective intellect or collective intuition in the context of 
a communal paradigm shift? Epistemologically, the author 
does not preclude the possibility of “collective conscious-
ness, since C. G. Jung’s (1995) “collective subconscious” as 
a psychological term is viable and denotes the hereditary 
stratification of humankind’s past experience, which is sto-
red in everyone’s subconscious as archetypes or symbolic 
images and myths, which may rise to the surface with great 
emotional effectiveness during times of crisis, and to signal 
our fate. According to S. Blackburn (2002), consciousness is 
supposed to be the most fundamental fact that we come in 
connect with (in philosophy), although it is almost impos-
sible to say what this is and problems that develop do not 
seem to be scientific in nature.
New discoveries and ideas in a community are not the 
only source of destructive-constructive changes therein. 
According to Kuhn, crises are the stage of change that fol-
lows discovery. As long as a paradigm’s methods (or tools) 
turn out to be capable of resolving its defined problems 
or questions, a community develops efficiently and effec-
tively. The reason is clear. Just like in industrial production, 
so too in science (so too in communities – the author), the 
replacement of tools is perceived as waste, and this action is 
postponed until absolutely necessary. Crises are important 
because they give notice that it is time to replace the tools 
(Kuhn 2003).
The next question is how to regulate the crisis. According 
to Kuhn, crises comprise the necessary preconditions for the 
development of a new theory (including a new idea – the 
author). Although one may lose faith in the state of long-
lasting anomalies and consider possible alternatives (and 
here I continue with Kuhn’s words), the paradigm that has 
led to the crisis is not renounced. Kuhn adds that if somet-
hing has already achieved the status of a paradigm, it will 
be declared invalid only if a replacement candidate already 
exists to replace it. … The decision to abandon a paradigm 
always means the simultaneous acceptance of another, and 
the making of this decision is always accompanied by the 
comparison of both paradigms with nature and each other 
(Kuhn 2003).
If an anomaly causes a crisis, it must be something more 
than just an anomaly. Making a paradigm compatible with 
nature or the state of the community is always difficult, but 
the majority of them are eliminated sooner or later; often 
as the result of process that could not be predicted. Kuhn 
has written that if an anomaly starts to seem like somet-
hing more than just another enigma in the community8, the 
transition to a crisis (and revolutionary change) has begun 
(Kuhn 2003).
The transition to crisis from an existing paradigm to a 
new one, from which a new tradition for the community 
may develop, is far from a cumulative process that may be 
executed based on the articulation or expansion of the old 
paradigm. … During the transition period, problems that 
can be resolved with the help of the old and new paradigm 
overlap to a great extent, but never totally. … Once the tran-
sition has been completed, the corresponding community9 
has changed its view of its object10, its methods and objectives 
(Kuhn 2003).
We have arrived at revolutionary change in paradigms. 
Kuhn also asks why a change in a paradigm should be called 
a revolution and starts searching for parallels between poli-
tical, or at certain levels between communal and scientific, 
revolutions.
Political revolutions get started from a deepening feeling 
usually prevalent among a narrow sector of the political 
public that the existing institutions have ceased to adequate-
ly deal with problems that are created by a situation that has 
partially been caused by these same institutions. According 
to Kuhn, scientific revolutions can also get started from a 
deepening feeling, which again is limited to a narrow subgroup 
in the scientific community, that the existing paradigm has 
stopped functioning adequately in the researching of some 
aspect of nature, to which this same paradigm has previously 
shown the way. In both political and scientific development, 
a feeling of inadequate functioning, which can lead to a 
crisis, is a necessary precondition for revolution. An impor-
tant comment to add here is that changes in society will 
only seem revolutionary to those (henceforth in Kuhn’s 
words), whose paradigms are affected. To bystanders they 
may seem like a normal part of the developmental process, like 
the Balkan wars at the beginning of the 20th century (Kuhn 
2003).
Kuhn’s subsequent interpretation of political revolution 
is as follows: The goal of political revolution is to change poli-
tical institutions in a manner that these institutions prohibit. 
Therefore, the abandonment of one set of institutions in favor 
of another is necessary; however, in the meanwhile, there are 
no institutions to rule the society (The author believes that 
Kuhn’s statement applies to political revolutions that chan-
ge the organization of a state). At first, there is only a crisis 
that weakens the role of the political institutions. A growing 
number of people become increasingly alienated from political 
life and start acting ever more strangely therein. Thereafter, 
when the crisis deepens, many of them tie themselves to some 
8 “Normal science” in Kuhn’s text.
9 “Scientific community” in Kuhn’s text.
10 “Specialized” in Kuhn’s text.
specific proposals for the reconstruction of the society within 
a new institutional framework. At this moment, society is 
divided into warring factions or political parties; some try 
to protect the aggregate of old institutions, while the others 
strive to establish a new one (A typical situation, for instance, 
during elections – the author). And once such a polarizati-
on has developed, political measures no longer function (In 
the democratic elections phase, these may still function, 
but will no longer function if the “masses have been called 
to arms” – the author). Since the parties in a revolutiona-
ry conflict diverge in regards to fundamental institutional 
principles on which the political change is to be achieved and 
assessed is based because they do not recognize any authority 
higher than these institutions to make the decisions regarding 
the differences of opinion, they must finally look for help in 
the persuasion of the masses, which is often accompanied 
by violence. Although revolutions have played an important 
role in the development of political institutions, the nature 
of their role depends on whether the events partially exist 
outside of politics or institutions (Kuhn 2003). Just like the 
choice between warring political institutions, so too the 
choice between warring paradigms may turn out to be a 
choice between incompatible convictions that reign in the 
life of a community, and therefore, it is inappropriate to 
equate political revolution and the revolutionary changes 
in a community’s paradigms. Kuhn adds that just as in poli-
tical revolution, there is no higher standard in the choice of 
paradigm than the approval of the concerned community 
(author’s emphasis).
We should point out that no paradigm can solve all the 
problems that is raises, and that neither old or new para-
digms will leave the same problems unresolved, which is 
way Kuhn (2003) says that paradigm debates include only 
one question – the solution of which problems is more impor-
tant?
Watkins’s (1999) highlights Kuhn and Popper’s different 
understanding of revolution, when he writes that Popper has 
recommended the following slogan for science: Revolution 
in permanence!11, while he credits Kuhn with the maxim: 
Not nostrums but normalcy!12 He adds that what is genui-
nely scientific for Kuhn is hardly science for Popper and what 
is genuinely scientific for Popper is hardly science for Kuhn 
(Watkins 1999). The asymmetric position of these two great 
men can be used to perfectly characterize possible asym-
metric situations and/or states in communities, which may 
result in anomalies, crises and situation-based revolutionary 
changes in paradigms.
Watkins emphasizes that a typical paradigm cycle com-
prise a prolonged ordinary state13 that leads the way to a short 
11 Revolution in permanence!
12 Not nostrums but normalcy!
13 “Normal science” in Watkins’s text.
and hectic revolutionary round, which is followed by a new 
ordinary state (Watkins 1999). The author’s position is that 
these cycles cannot alternate without the transition periods 
that the author also shows in his model below.
Watkins criticizes Kuhn in several episodes, but here we 
emphasize Watkins’s (1999) position that Kuhn sees an ana-
logy between the scientific community and the religious com-
munity and sees science as the scientists’ religion.  Moreover, if 
this is true, Watkins asks why normal science is elevated over 
extraordinary science.14 He also criticizes Kuhn’s approach 
based on the example of one original scientist who brings 
forth a new paradigm. Based thereon, Watkins states that a 
new paradigm can never appear from normal science (or an 
ordinary state – the author) as it is characterized by Kuhn 
(Watkins 1999). The author does not totally agree with 
Watkins on the point. The author’s position is that the role 
of the individual in definitely important, and something 
must develop in the head of someone for the first time. At 
the same time, flashes of such ideas by the authors will not 
bring about changes in the community paradigm without 
the approval of the (majority) of the community. At the 
same time, one must take the position that Watkins did 
not directly say so and his statement should be treated as 
reductio ad absurdum, in order to show the value of some 
of Kuhn’s positions.
Watkins (1999) criticizes Kuhn’s paradigm change phase 
and describes it “independently of Kuhn” as the thesis of five 
paradigm changes. These are the Paradigm-Monopoly, No-
Interregnum, Incompatibility, Gestalt-Switch and Instant-
Paradigm theses.  Summarizing this, what we can conclude 
from Watkins is that paradigms are resistant to change and 
do not tolerate rivals; that a power vacuum does not develop 
between old and new paradigms; that new and old paradi-
gms are not compatible; that a new paradigm does not repla-
ce an old one in stages but with a gestalt switch; and a new 
paradigm has no preliminary story – it is relatively drastic. A 
new paradigm must be sufficiently authoritative right from 
the start in order to challenge a dominant paradigm.
Popper (1999) finds that Kuhn’s normal science appro-
ach may be very suited to astronomy, but not to the evoluti-
on of the theory of matter. This may be true in the context of 
a scientific community, and the author has no good reason 
to argue with Popper. However, the author hopes to find 
suitable references in Kuhn’s treatment of paradigms for 
the epistemological description of territorial community 
paradigms.
In his criticism of Kuhn’s scientific revolution, Popper 
introduces the significance of the dogmatism concept and 
the role of dogmatic scientists by Kuhn, and differs with 
Kuhn in regard to this question (Popper 1999).  From this, 
14 Extraordinary science is defined as revolutionary, i.e paradigm-
changing, science.
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one must conclude that a paradigm, especially paradigms 
based on very dogmatic bases, are not and cannot be very 
receptive to criticism, or let themselves be intimidated by 
the first anomaly that is encountered, which is why the road 
to a crisis, and no less a revolutionary change, is not always 
very smooth.
Popper (1999), like Watkins (1999), stresses that an intel-
lectual revolution often resembles a religious conversion. The 
new reference (or ideas – the author) may strike us like a 
lightening bolt. However, this does not mean that we are not 
able to critically and rationally assess our previous views in 
a new light. Thereby, Popper alludes to the fact that he does 
not agree with Kuhn’s interpretation.
5. Explanation of the model
Based on the figure below, if we move clockwise from the 
beginning of the process (at the bottom center of the circle) 
and assess the stages related to the paradigm, we must first 
emphasize a certain period of adaptation at the beginning 
of the process, which results in the “pre” or preliminary 
state. The evolutionary development of the new paradigm 
takes us to the “hic et nunc”15 stage, or ordinary state.
Chalmers has summarily explained Kuhn’s picture of 
scientific evolution with the following scheme: preliminary 
science – normal science – crisis – new normal science – new 
crisis (Chalmers 1998).  From the author’s viewpoint, the 
same logic applies to territorial communities in the con-
text of paradigms. Therefore, it is possible and actually 
natural that crises as well as (revolutionary) changes (even 
the election of local government councils or village elders, 
which may be accompanied by crises or result in significant, 
including revolutionary, changes). This in turn brings us 
to the “post”16 or subsequent state, which is followed by 
an adaptation period, and once this is successful, the pro-
cess evolves and a new round begins. If the adaptation to a 
new and decisive paradigm is not successful, it may cause 
the termination of the community as the process (here, the 
example of elections is not appropriate, more appropriate 
is a change in governmental regime, or the dying out of a 
small rural municipality or village, etc.).
At this point, it should be emphasized that revolutionary 
change does not necessary mean a change for the worse. 
What is considered bad by someone is a matter of opinion 
and a separate subject. In the aforementioned context, cons-
tructive developments are intended.
6. Conclusions
Kuhn does not equate scientific communities and scientific 
paradigms. The author also does not do so in the case of 
15 Hic et nunc (Latin), here and now.
16 Post- (< Latin post after), after, being, subsequent.
territorial communities and their paradigms. A paradigm 
is a “certain way of seeing the world”, which once accepted 
by a number of scientists creates a community from these 
scientists; or a religious community from believers; or a 
territorial community from the people living on a certain 
territory.
According to the definition borrowed from Kuhn by 
the author, a paradigm of a territorial community should 
be interpreted as general theoretical assumptions and laws 
(including practices) and their means of implementation 
that are used by the members of the corresponding territo-
rial community that shape and develop the paradigm with 
its activities.
Based on the approach in this article, paradigms in the 
context of territorial communities can be explained as fol-
lows: the paradigms of a territorial community determine 
the important objects that the community deals with, along 
with the related problems and/or questions and the resolu-
tions provided for these problems and/or questions.
Based on the author’s interpretation, territorial com-
munities are human associations that are related to self-
organizing territories, the sequence of timely states of which 
is called a process. From this, it ensues that a territorial 
community is a process. A separate issue is whether it can 
be managed or not; and by whom or what it can be mana-
ged. In this article, the author found the following answer: 
territorial communities as processes cannot be managed by 
the leaders elected to do so. Based on the author’s interpre-
tation, a territorial community is managed (influenced) by 
the territorial community’s paradigms by direct example or 
separate rules, thereby generating changes in the commu-
nity and itself being in a constant state of change.
Based on the above, the author takes the summary 
position that the influencers of territorial communities 
are paradigms which, paraphrasing Kuhn, are the general 
achievements of communal development  that provide the 
members of the community with an example for determi-
ning and resolving problems for a certain period of time. 
In the article, the author takes the position that various 
types of communities are substantively different and that 
the paradigms of various types of communities are subs-
tantively similar.
Kuhn’s picture of scientific evolution is summarily 
explained by Chalmers in the following scheme: preliminary 
science – normal science – crisis – new normal science – new 
crisis. According to the model proposed by the author, a 
certain period of adaptation must be emphasized at the 
beginning of the process, which results in the preliminary 
state. The evolutionary development of the new paradigm 
takes us to the ordinary state. This in turn brings us to the 
subsequent state, which is followed by another adaptation 
period, and once this is successfully completed, the process 
evolves and a new round begins.
Changes in a community’s paradigms are accompanied 
by changes in the developmental process of the territorial 
community, and are therefore important influences of the 
process.
Fig. The paradigmatic development stages of territorial com-
munities as processes.
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